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Publication - Dr Piotr Korczak

    Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives

    Citation

    Korczak, P & Liu, X, 2014, ‘Managerial shareholding policies and retention of vested equity incentives’. Journal of Empirical Finance, vol 27., pp. 116-129

    Abstract

    Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm adopts a minimum executive shareholding policy. We provide the first evidence of the effectiveness of such policies in that respect. Using data for UK FTSE 350 companies we show that executives whose ownership is below the minimum set by the policy retain more newly vesting equity and the incentives to retain shares weaken when the holdings are above the minimum. We also document economic implications of compliance with the policy and we find higher firm valuations when actual ownership increases relative to the minimum holdings required. Our results have implications for the debate on executive remuneration regulations and practices.

    Full details in the University publications repository